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THE PERILS OF COURTROOM STORIES 
Stephan Landsman* 
THE CRIME OF SHEILA MCGOUGH. By Janet Malcolm. New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf. 1999. Pp. 161. $22. 
I. ONCE UPON A TIME-THE ALLEGEDLY SAD TALE 
OF SHEILA MCGOUGH 
As Janet Malcolm1 tells it, Sheila McGough was a middle-aged sin­
gle woman living at home with her parents and working as an editor 
and administrator in the publications department of the Carnegie 
Institute when she decided to switch careers and go to law school. She 
applied and was admitted to the then recently accredited law school at 
George Mason University. After graduation, she began a solo prac­
tice in northern Virginia that involved a significant amount of state­
appointed criminal defense work. 
In 1986, approximately four years after her graduation from law 
school, McGough received a call requesting assistance from an incar­
cerated arrestee named Bob Bailes. From the very start, McGough's 
assistance to Bailes was unorthodox. Immediately upon meeting him 
at the Fairfax County, Virginia, lockup, she decided that his apparent 
poor health warranted her taking the unusual step of personally sign­
ing as guarantor for his bail. McGough said of this decision: 
What I did was something lawyers never, never do. I didn't go out of my 
way to tell anybody I had done that. It was just so unprofessional . . . . I 
would not have committed crimes for my clients. But anything that was 
just risking my time and my money - if I had it - I would not hesitate 
to do. [p. 34] 
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University 
College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon; J.D. 1972, Harvard. -Ed. 
1. Janet Malcolm is a Czech-born American journalist whose parents fled their home­
land when she was four, in 1939. She has, for many years, been one of the leading writers on 
the staff of The New Yorker magazine. A series of her articles have been turned into pro­
vocative and high-profile books. These have included her volume about Freudian psychiatry 
and the iconoclastic psychiatrist, Jeffrey Masson, entitled IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984); 
her sharply critical assessment of the work of journalist Joe McGinniss regarding the case of 
convicted murderer, Jeffrey MacDonald, entitled THE JOURNALIST AND TIIE MURDERER 
(1990); and her biography of the marriage of Sylvia Plafu and Ted Hughes, entitled THE 
SILENTWOMAN (1995). 
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McGough thereafter began preparing to represent Bailes at his up­
coming federal court trial2 on charges that he had provided false in­
formation to secure a bank loan and used a false social security num­
ber in that transaction. 
While Bailes was awaiting trial, he conducted a number of business 
transactions out of McGough's office. These involved negotiations to 
sell certain allegedly still valid nineteenth-century insurance company 
charters that were claimed to excuse the holder from the constraints of 
state regulation or review.3 On June 18, 1986, two men named Frank 
Manfredi and Francis Boccagna agreed, through their attorney, Alan 
Morris, to buy two of the charters for $900,000 each with a down pay­
ment of $75,000 for both. They were not really the principals in this 
deal but were "brokers"4 for an investment banker named Kirkpatrick 
MacDonald. The down payment was wired into Sheila McGough's at­
torney trust account. McGough immediately drew the funds out of 
that account, transferring $70,000 to Bailes and keeping $5,000 for 
herself. Although Malcolm does not explore the matter in detail, 
other transactions involving the sale of charters also took place at 
around the same time. 
In the late summer of 1986, Bailes, represented by McGough, went 
on trial in the bank fraud case. He was convicted and sentenced to 
five years in federal prison.5 The story, however, was far from over. 
McGough redoubled her efforts on Bailes's behalf. She sought his 
release from prison by a variety of means. These included what one 
federal district judge found to be a frivolous attack on the sentence 
imposed upon Bailes6 as well as the instigation of a bankruptcy pro­
ceeding. In the bankruptcy action, one set of corporations owned by 
Bailes sought bankruptcy protection while another set of his shell 
companies requested that the court release him from prison so he 
could facilitate the payment of their alleged claims. Although it would 
appear these claims were nothing but shams, McGough worked tire­
lessly to effectuate the scheme. 
2. The trial was to be held in the late summer of 1986. 
3. A lawyer who represented McGough, later described these charters to Malcolm in 
the following terms: "These guys were buying insurance charters that gave them the right to 
sell insurance without reserves. That's like printing money. What are they talking about?" 
P. 72. 
4. This is the term used by Judge Richard Posner to describe Manfredi and Boccagna in 
his review of Malcolm's book. See Richard Posner, In the Fraud Archives, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC, Apr. 19, 1999, at29. 
5. See United States v. Bales, 813 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the defendant 
used several aliases, including "Bob Bailes" - the name Malcolm uses throughout her 
book). 
6. The federal judge who heard this challenge to the sentence, Judge James Turk, was so 
incensed by its frivolity that he threatened McGough with sanctions for pressing it. Pp. 29-
33. 
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Bankruptcy Court Judge George Benson eventually consented to 
Bailes's release. This, however, could only be accomplished if a fed­
eral district court judge would agree to enter an order setting the de­
fendant at liberty. The first judge McGough approached, Judge 
Charles Richey, agreed to the release on condition that the United 
States Attorney's office assent. The United States Attorney was then 
preparing a second, much more serious case against Bailes7 and appar­
ently would have opposed freeing the prisoner. Rather than accept 
this decision or enter negotiations with the United States Attorney's 
office, McGough approached a second federal district court judge, 
Stanley Harris, concerning the matter. McGough did not inform 
Judge Harris of Judge Richey's prior ruling, and Harris issued an or­
der releasing Bailes into McGough's custody. Judge Harris rescinded 
this order as soon as he learned of the prior, undisclosed Richey rul­
ing. Judge Harris was so disturbed by McGough's behavior that he 
sought to have her disciplined by the District of Columbia Bar for her 
conduct. 
In 1988, Bailes was tried in a North Carolina federal court for his 
efforts to sell insurance company charters.8 The government's case 
proved so strong and Bailes's defense so weak that in midstream he 
shifted to an insanity plea. That claim was rejected by the jury, and, 
upon conviction, Bailes was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. 
In the meantime, a number of those either injured or affronted by 
McGough's behavior during her efforts on Bailes's behalf began civil 
proceedings against her. The first to proceed was the investment 
banker, MacDonald, who had lost $75,000 in the escrow deposit inci­
dent in June 1986. He brought suit against McGough in 1987 to re­
cover his lost funds. Included as a defendant in this action was the in­
surer that had provided McGough with Errors and Omissions 
insurance. Shortly before trial, in the fall of 1988, MacDonald settled 
with the insurance company, receiving $75,000. One remarkable event 
in the civil action was the proffer of apparently forged documents by 
the defense immediately before the case was to go to trial. Who had 
forged the documents never became clear, but the most likely candi­
date was Bailes. Later disclosures, however, suggested that McGough 
may have been involved, at least insofar as seeking to get the forgeries 
notarized long after their alleged execution date. 
In October of 1988, MacDonald took the next step in his campaign 
against McGough by seeking her disbarment in Virginia. Other bar­
related complaints were then being processed, including that made by 
Judge Harris. The United States Attorney's office in Alexandria, 
7. This is the case that would be tried in a North Carolina federal court in 1988. 
8. See United States v. Bailes, Nos. 88-5172, 88-5674, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 12199, at 
*1-2 (4th Cir. June 14, 1991). 
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Virginia, responded to all this by initiating a grand jury inquiry into 
McGough's conduct. The grand jury proceedings resulted in 
McGough's being indicted on fifteen felony charges. 
McGough's criminal trial took place in 1990, and addressed 
charges related to the withdrawal of funds from her escrow account, 
her behavior in the bankruptcy proceedings, and a number of other 
matters.9 The federal prosecutor, Mark Hulkower, subpoenaed more 
than fifty witnesses for the case (although not all were called to tes­
tify). Among those who gave evidence against McGough were four 
judges, including federal district court judges Richey and Harris, who 
had been entangled in the bankruptcy scheme. 
At the heart of the case against McGough was the withdrawal of 
the $75,000 MacDonald deposit from her trust account. The "bro­
kers " Manfredi and Boccagna, as well as their attorney, Morris, all tes­
tified that this withdrawal was in direct violation of their understand­
ing with McGough that the funds would be held in escrow until the 
two $900,000 deals were consummated. The credibility of these three 
witnesses was open to question since each was serving or had served 
time in prison, and two (Manfredi and Morris) were disbarred attor­
neys. Moreover, as Malcolm notes, but as McGough's defense counsel 
failed to observe, the key telephone conversation concerning the es­
crow arrangement lasted but one minute - a suspiciously short time 
to conduct all the business the government witnesses claimed was 
handled. MacDonald appeared for the government and reiterated 
many of his charges against McGough. These were amplified upon by 
Michael Wyatt, MacDonald's lawyer in the 1987 civil action involving 
McGough and her Errors and Omissions insurer. Wyatt described the 
events surrounding the proffer of the forged documents on the eve of 
the civil trial. 
Prosecutor Hulkower's overarching theory was that Sheila 
McGough had joined Bailes in a series of illegal scams designed to 
benefit both the attorney and her erstwhile client. In the govern­
ment's case, however, the motive for McGough's choosing to forsake 
the role of honest attorney and join forces with her con man client was 
never made entirely clear. There was some evidence (albeit thin) of a 
romantic attraction as well as the more prosaic suggestion that the mo­
tive might have been greed. 
The defense strategy was to attack the credibility of the prosecu­
tion's key witnesses and to argue that McGough had done no more 
than act as a zealous lawyer on behalf of her client, Bailes. This may 
9. See United States v. McGough, No. 91-5511, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 28977, at *2 (4th 
Cir. Dec. 12, 1991) (charges enumerated by the court of appeals included conspiracy to de­
fraud, wire and mail fraud, receiving stolen monies and securities, obstruction of justice, wit­
ness intimidation, and perjury). 
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not have been a particularly effective defense, but counsel were im­
peded from any other choice by McGough's refusal to take the stand 
in her own defense or sanction any sustained attack on Bailes. Her 
justification for these choices was an assertion that she owed Bailes a 
continuing duty of loyalty and confidentiality.10 The defense called a 
series of lawyers to testify in an effort to demonstrate that McGough 
had acted appropriately in her dealings with Bailes. Among those 
who testified was McGough's attorney in the 1987 civil proceedings, 
Kenneth Labowitz. He believed that his client had acted honestly. 
However, after McGough's criminal conviction, he emphatically as­
serted that McGough had shown extremely poor judgment in her rela­
tions with Bailes, a con man who Labowitz thought had taken advan­
tage of her lack of legal experience, training, and supervision. Three 
lawyers who had dealings with Bailes also appeared but were not 
asked whether Bailes had ever tried to swindle them or use their of­
fices and trust accounts for his schemes. (Several would later tell 
Malcolm that Bailes had done so.) 
The jury did not buy the defense's arguments and on November 
21, 1990, one day before Thanksgiving, convicted McGough on four­
teen of the fifteen felony charges. Of the jury's deliberations Malcolm 
said: "[T]he jury, evidently needing the afternoon hours for shopping 
for cranberries and canned pumpkin, reached its verdict by lunchtime 
after six hours of deliberation" (p. 6). Malcolm says that she, after ar­
duous investigation, came to share a number of McGough's views re­
garding her conviction. McGough set these out in a letter which 
stated: 
I was a defense lawyer who irritated some federal judges and federal 
prosecutors in the course of defending a client. The federal prosecutors 
in my hometown [Alexandria, Virginia] investigated me for four years, 
and when they failed to tum up anything illegal in what I was doing, they 
made up some crimes for me and found people to support them with 
false testimony . ... I didn't commit any of the 14 felonies I was convicted 
of. The U.S. Government office in Alexandria "framed" me. [p. 6] 
Malcolm also has harsh words for McGough's defense counsel and the 
legal system: 
Her lawyers had evidently not been up to the task. To win their case, 
they needed to tell a story at least as compelling as the prosecution's -
the story, as Hulkower [the prosecutor] neatly summarized it in his 
opening statement, "of what happens when an attorney violates the first 
rule of criminal defense and crosses the line from representation of the 
criminal to participation in his crimes." But no powerful counterstory 
was ever told by Kohlman and Rochon [defense counsel]. With their 
10. Bailes died in 1995. This led McGough to decide, or at least so she told Malcolm, 
that she had been freed from the obligation of confidentiality. 
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hands tied by the double bonds of the rules of evidence and the stubborn 
silence of their client, they could do little more than rush around putting 
out little fires in wastebaskets as the entire building burned to the 
ground. [pp. 11-12] 
In the end, Malcolm concluded that McGough was an "exquisite 
heroine" (p. 161), "a woman of almost preternatural honesty and de­
cency" (p. 6), who through "the heedless selflessness that propelled 
her downfall has thrown into relief the radicalism of her vision of de­
fense law as a calling for the incorrigibly loyal" (p. 161). 
II. SHOULD WE BELIEVE MALCOLM'S VERSION? 
There are a number of reasons not to accept Janet Malcolm's re­
construction and interpretation of Sheila McGough's story. Some are 
contained within the story itself while others are highlighted in Judge 
Richard Posner's assessment of Malcolm's book in a review published 
in The New Republic in April of last year.11 The most serious charge 
leveled by Malcolm is that the government "framed" Sheila 
McGough. It is not exactly clear what this means, but Malcolm herself 
appears to reject the charge by declaring: 
Sheila has never been able to demonstrate to me that Hulkower and his 
boss, Henry Hudson, knew she was innocent and prosecuted her all the 
same. "I can't prove it yet," she wrote in 1996, and she hasn't proved it 
two years later. While it seems clear to me that Morris and Manfredi and 
Boccagna testified falsely when they said that Sheila told them she would 
hold the money in escrow, it isn't at all clear that Hulkower knew this 
and was cynically supporting a theory he didn't believe in. I think he be­
lieved Sheila was Bailes's gun moll and had lied and cheated on his be­
half. He had never met Sheila - he didn't know what I know about her 
character. He professed to find my defense of her pitiful. [p. 110] 
With that charge out of the way, two assertions remain: first, that 
McGough was "almost preternaturally honest"; and second, that the 
explanation for her conduct was her selfless loyalty to her client. 
As to the claim about McGough's honesty, the record Malcolm 
sets out is not completely convincing. Although Malcolm is fully satis­
fied on the point, she does discuss at least one instance which draws 
McGough's candor into question. That incident involved a man 
named Fred Quarles, who had made inquiries about purchasing one of 
Bailes's infamous insurance company charters. Quarles had pursued 
the matter for some time and, as part of his inquiries, eventually asked 
McGough where Bailes was. The question came shortly after Bailes 
had been imprisoned pursuant to the 1986 Virginia bank fraud convic­
tion. Apparently to protect the prospects of a deal and/or the reputa-
11. See Posner, supra note 4. 
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tion of a client, McGough lied about Bailes's situation. As she put it 
when Malcolm confronted her about the matter: 
"Quarles told the truth. I did mislead him," Sheila said. 
"What did you say!" 
"Yes, I told Quarles that nothing was final, that things were on appeal. 
That wasn't truthful. I did try to mislead him. All I can say in my de­
fense is that I didn't want to give out damaging information about a cli­
ent without his permission. A more experienced attorney would have 
found a better way of doing this. I didn't do it well. He took me by sur­
prise, and instead of a generic, lawyerlike answer like, 'Oh, I don't ever 
give out information about a client,' I misled him. I wasn't under oath. 
It wasn't illegal. But I should have done it differently." [p. 129] 
This anecdote suggests that truth was no real obstacle when 
Bailes's (and perhaps McGough's) interests were at stake. Despite 
this evidence, Malcolm chose to cling tenaciously to her belief that 
McGough was extraordinarily honest. Her spin on the Quarles matter 
is revealing, if unpersuasive. Malcolm says of the incident: "Her con­
fession to me that she had misled Quarles was only further evidence of 
her honesty. She could have fudged or equivocated, but she had cho­
sen to tell the shameful truth about herself" (p. 130). Confession may 
be good for the soul, but it is not proof of thoroughgoing honesty. 
This seems a weak defense and one that is strained beyond the 
breaking point when reconsidered in light of Judge Posner's disclo­
sures, to be considered below. 
What remains of Malcolm's claims is the assertion that McGough 
was guided in her actions by a selfless loyalty to her client, Bob Bailes. 
It is true that McGough seems, in Malcolm's telling of the story, ex­
traordinarily, even self-sacrificingly, loyal. Yet much of what Malcolm 
describes as noble loyalty may equally well be described as muddle­
headedness or downright stupidity. McGough took every opportunity 
to help her client sell his plainly suspect insurance charters, manipu­
late the system to escape confinement, and achieve a number of other 
self-serving ends. She let him pursue his dubious business out of her 
office and use her trust account without constraint or review. She told 
misleading stories on his behalf and did whatever seemed necessary to 
get the bankruptcy scheme to work. At a minimum, her conduct was 
careless and irresponsible. Even Malcolm is forced to concede: "It 
seems unbelievable that someone who had a law degree could be so 
credulous and so careless" (p. 25). Indeed, it does seem unbelievable. 
None of the numerous attorneys Malcolm questioned thought 
McGough had acted sensibly. Labowitz, her civil counsel, said 
McGough's "judgment appeared to be flawed. It is inexplicable to me 
what she was hoping to accomplish when she took some of the actions 
she took on behalf of Mr. Bailes" (p. 73). He concluded that the es­
crow transaction, in particular, was handled in a thoroughly unprofes-
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sional way. One of her criminal defense lawyers, Gary Kohlman, 
thought that McGough had performed services for her client "that 
started stretching the boundaries - or perhaps went beyond the 
boundaries" (p. 112). Her other criminal counsel, Mark Rochon, said: 
"What did she do? She simply followed the directions of that idiot 
[Bailes]. She lacked common sense. She was brand-new out of law 
school, with no supporting network of lawyers to temper her judg­
ment" (p. 123). William Sheffield, an attorney whom Bailes had tried 
to manipulate in precisely the same way as he did McGough, barred 
Bailes from wiring funds into his trust account and confronted Bailes 
when he disregarded Sheffield's instructions. 
Sheila McGough's failure to control Bailes and her advocacy on his 
behalf seem far more like gullible na'ivete than noble self-sacrifice. It 
harmed not only McGough, but a number of others who had dealings 
with Bailes. The record Malcolm advances fairly shouts this conclu­
sion. Moreover, when anyone other than McGough is single-mindedly 
or dogmatically devoted to an objective, Malcolm is immediately sus­
picious. This was certainly the case with respect to Malcolm's assess­
ment of the investment banker MacDonald. His long and unrelenting 
pursuit of McGough is presented as questionable, and he is, through­
out Malcolm's book cast in an unflattering light. His passion for re­
venge or justice (depending on how one looks at it) seems far less ob­
jectionable and dangerous than McGough's zeal on Bailes's behalf. 
Malcolm, perhaps inadvertently, provides a number of alternatives 
rather than noble zeal, to explain McGough's actions. One of the 
most intriguing is that McGough undertook her efforts on Bailes's be­
half out of a sense of guilt at having botched his defense in the 
Virginia bank fraud case. As McGough herself put it: 
"Where I blundered was to take on legal matters I wasn't prepared for," 
she said. "I should have just said no. It was an error of pride. I was flat­
tered by Bobby's trust in me. But I didn't have the proper experience, 
and I didn't represent him adequately." [p. 40] 
Another possibility is that McGough, because of her na'ivete and inex­
perience, was conned again and again by the artful Bailes. All of her 
counsel, both civil and criminal, appeared to subscribe to this notion, 
and it is amply supported by the reports of lawyers who, through bitter 
experience, were acquainted with Bob Bailes's modus operandi. Al­
ternatively, or in addition, McGough seemed to be experiencing se­
vere mental distress during this period.12 Her civil counsel, Kenneth 
Labowitz, said of his client during the run up to the 1987 civil trial: 
"She was coming apart at the time of the civil case. I mean, emotion­
ally. It was unpleasant to watch" (p. 73). There is good reason to sus-
12. I would like to thank my wife, Janice Toran, for bringing this point to my attention. 
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pect that her choices in relation to Bailes's affairs were the product of 
emotional pressures that deprived her of sound judgment. 
Judge Richard Posner has written a lengthy review of The Crime of 
Sheila McGough.13 As a part of his assessment of the book, he under­
took an independent examination of the record in McGough's case. 
What he reports having found in that record raises additional ques­
tions about McGough's honesty and Janet Malcolm's interpretation of 
the case. Posner concludes that "the evidence taken as a whole leaves 
little doubt of McGough's guilt,"14 and that Malcolm's description of it 
should, most fairly, be described as "fiction" rather than reportage.15 
Posner notes a substantial number of instances of McGough's un­
truthfulness or fraud - instances not reported by Malcolm. Among 
these is the fact that MacDonald's lawyer in the original charter deal, a 
man named Blazzard, testified at McGough's trial that two weeks after 
the $75,000 was wired into McGough's trust account, he spoke with 
her and she assured him that the money was still being held in escrow 
in the account.16 Blazzard's testimony appears to provide independent 
evidence, by a credible source, of McGough's dishonesty regarding the 
escrow arrangement. Charges of dishonesty are reinforced, according 
to Posner, by McGough's denial during pretrial depositions in the 
MacDonald civil suit "that she had represented Bailes in connection 
with the sale of the insurance charters."17 Posner also notes that 
MacDonald's $75,000 was not the only deposit removed by McGough 
from her trust account and divvied up with Bailes during the course of 
the insurance charter scam. Two $25,000 deposits, one paid by a man 
named Johnson, and the other by two investors named Invin and Sali, 
were both removed from the account and shared out between 
McGough and Bailes. In both cases the depositors said they had been 
assured that the funds would be held in escrow until various charter 
deals were concluded. When Sali sought return of his deposit, 
"McGough threatened to sue him and to have him arrested."18 
Posner also focuses on McGough's exceedingly troubling behavior 
during what he calls the "fantastic scheme"19 to free Bailes by means 
of a bankruptcy proceeding. As he puts it: "McGough not only pre­
pared numerous pleadings and motions in these fraudulent proceed­
ings, but also procured and paid lawyers to represent the sham credi-
13. See Posner, supra note 4. 
14. Id. at 32. 
15. Id. at 34. 
16. See id. at 29-30. 
17. Id. at 30. 
18. Id. 
19. Id. 
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tors."20 Judge Posner's assessment of the record raises profound ques­
tions about whether we should accept Malcolm's description of the 
matter. It seems far more likely than not that the prosecution and jury 
got the case right. 
III. THE MORAL ACCORDING TO MALCOLM 
Malcolm sees McGough21 as a paradigmatic case - one that can 
yield an enormous number of lessons. Malcolm's central concern is 
with the impact of narrative on courtroom adjudication. What courts 
and juries do, according to Malcolm, is hear and weigh competing nar­
ratives. The most convincing story is the one that wins. Malcolm sees 
this as profoundly dangerous because the best narrative is not neces­
sarily the truth. The problem starts with language itself, "which pro­
scribes unregulated truth-telling and requires that our utterances tell 
coherent, and thus never merely true, stories" (p. 4). While in most 
situations "the line between narration and lying is a pretty clear one" 
(p. 4), that is not necessarily the case in trials. The rules of evidence 
and the manipulations of adversarial lawyers blur the factual outline, 
inhibit the flow of information, and leave the decision.maker vulner­
able to the lure of too neat a tale. These problems are exacerbated by 
the fact that virtually every witness suffers those small lapses of mem­
ory and takes those verbal shortcuts that will make him or her vulner­
able to a lawyer's cross-examination and accusations of untruthfulness. 
The reconstruction that takes place in the courtroom is more "like 
ruins than proper buildings; there is never enough solid building mate­
rial and always too much dust" (p. 19). Malcolm's sense is that law­
yers see truth as "a nuisance" (p. 26). This is particularly the case be­
cause "truth does not make a good story" (p. 26), and lawyers are 
constantly striving to fabricate the "good story," one that will win the 
case. In the end, what helps is used and what is problematic is dis­
carded. Out of this winnowing process, the lawyers shape and fashion 
their narratives: "Trials are won by attorneys whose stories fit, and 
lost by those whose stories are like the shapeless housecoat that truth, 
in her disdain of appearances, has chosen as her uniform" (p. 67). For 
Malcolm, McGough's case is an archetypical example of all this - the 
prosecution's story fit. The tale of a renegade lawyer who crossed the 
line was more attractive than the defense's hobbled contentions about 
loyalty, although Malcolm was convinced that the latter was indeed 
true. 
20. Id. 
21. See United States v. McGough, No. 91-5511, 1991 U. S. App. LEXIS 28977, at * 2  (4th 
Cir. Dec. 12, 1991). 
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The implications, according to Malcolm, are dire: "Law stories are 
empty stories. They take the reader to a world entirely constructed of 
tendentious argument, and utterly devoid of the truth of the real world, 
where things are allowed to fall as they may" (pp. 78-79; emphases 
added). In this view, biased argument rules over the facts. There is no 
chance for factually based assessment, and the lawyers' reconstruc­
tions blot out the underlying reality. The jury is left guessing. One 
would think that these conclusions damn the system beyond any hope 
of redemption, yet Malcolm is, at least slightly, more circumspect: 
The method of adversarial law is to pit two trained palterers against each 
other. The jury is asked to guess not which side is telling the truth - it 
knows that neither is - but which side is being untruthful in aid of the 
truth. No one has thought of a better system, but everyone who has par­
ticipated in it - whether as defendant, defense lawyer, plaintiff, plain­
tiff's lawyer, prosecutor, judge, or juror - has gained a sense of its cyni­
cism and absurdism. [p. 79] 
These are weighty charges. It is hard to know what to make of the ca­
veat "no one has thought of a better system," but implicit in Malcolm's 
argument would seem to be the suggestion that any procedure which 
leaves participants with a sense that the process is a cynical hoax and 
essentially absurd cannot be one that is likely to endure. 
Malcolm draws several further lessons from her examination of 
McGough's case. She sees in McGough's story a set of insights about 
lawyers. The key to legal success is the ability to tell a good story, and 
those who can best manipulate the evidence triumph. Such is the case 
with McGough's prosecutor, Mark Hulkower. When faced with fac­
tual inconsistencies, he simply designed an effective cover story: "[I]n 
[his] capable hands ... the narrative beautifully held. Hulkower sim­
ply wouldn't allow the inconsistencies to impede the progress of his 
story" (p. 24). The silver-tongued advocate, something of a stock 
character, triumphs and dooms his less talented opponents to defeat. 
In this world, the merits are of little importance, and the lawyer's cun­
ning is all that really counts - a cynical insight, indeed! 
Lawyers are not only amoral mouthpieces, they are self-serving as 
well. Lawyers "will do almost anything to stay in [judges'] favor" (p. 
112). One sees this most clearly, according to Malcolm, at side-bar 
conferences. In remarks apparently adapted from her own brief essay 
in a book based on a Yale Law School symposium,22 Malcolm says that 
at sidebars "lawyers drop their masks of antagonism and behave like 
schoolboys in front of the teacher, vying ... to impress her" (p. 113). 
This sycophancy signals a deep disloyalty to or, as Malcolm puts it, 
22. See Janet Malcolm, The Side-Bar Conference, in LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 106 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter LA W'S 
STORIES]. 
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betrayal of the client. For most lawyers, unlike McGough, self­
preservation and advancement are placed far ahead of loyalty to or 
zeal on behalf of a client. All of McGough's lawyers are accused of 
betrayal. Labowitz, her civil lawyer, takes Malcolm "aback by the 
coldness" of his remarks about his client (p. 72). Malcolm says: "I had 
expected the posture of loyalty to hold a bit better than this" (p. 72). 
Kohlman and Rochon, McGough's criminal defense counsel, fare no 
better. Kohlman suggests to Malcolm that McGough may have trans­
gressed the boundary of propriety in her efforts on Bailes's behalf. In 
this suggestion, Malcolm sees Kohlman straying "across the line, sepa­
rating loyalty tempered by honesty from careless betrayal" (p. 112). 
Rochon, too, "subtly undermined Sheila" in his remarks to Malcolm 
and, hence, joined Kohlman in the ranks of betrayers. As Malcolm 
sees it, in a system dedicated to dissembling narratives, it is not sur­
prising to find lawyers who pay no more than lip service to their cli­
ents. 
Malcolm's third major target is the jury. McGough's jury is de­
picted as shamefully uninterested in getting at the truth in the case be­
fore them. After six hours of deliberations, at least part of which were 
held on the day before Thanksgiving, they decided to convict on four­
teen of the fifteen charges. Malcolm suggests (without any cited evi­
dence) that their motivation for deciding was a desire to get on with 
holiday grocery shopping. She later suggests that the same jurors 
(again without any articulated proof) disregarded the testimony of a 
particular black defense witness because they were an "all-white 
Alexandria [Virginia] jury" and that similar "testimony might have 
impressed a New York jury" (p. 36). All of this is consistent with 
Malcolm's vision of the jury system in general. Late in her book, she 
writes: 
The jury system is posited on the idea that people are capable of sus­
pending their normal state of having a fixed opinion about everything 
and allowing new ideas to penetrate the defenses of their old ones. But 
this is like believing people capable of suspending the peristaltic motion 
of their stomachs. It is like imagining a ballpark filled with placidly neu­
tral spectators. Every juror listens to the testimony through the filter of 
his preconceptions and as a (conscious or unconscious) rooter for one 
side or the other. The recognition of this actuality is what gives jury se­
lection its tense atmosphere and has, in our culture of store-bought horse 
sense, created an industry of experts on jury selection, to whom each side 
now runs for help whenever it can afford to do so. [p. 131] 
In the end, Malcolm constructs, out of her reading of McGough's case, 
a devastating portrait of the justice system: beguiled by stories, misled 
by lawyers, and in the hands of dogmatically closed-minded jurors. 
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IV. DOES MALCOLM GET IT RIGHT? 
Malcolm's work does touch a nerve. Ours is a time seemingly pre­
occupied with the idea of narrative. The importance of stories to cases 
has even been remarked on by the United States Supreme Court. In 
the 1997 decision, Old Chief v. United States,23 Justice Souter, writing 
for a closely divided court, emphasized the importance of judicial rec­
ognition "of the offering party's need for evidentiary richness and nar­
rative integrity in presenting a case."24 The lawyers on each side of a 
criminal case are, according to the Court, entitled to tell their stories, 
more or less, in their own way. Their evidentiary offerings are to be 
treated as having a "force beyond any linear scheme of reasoning. "25 
The natural and appropriate result of each lawyer's storytelling is that 
"as its pieces come together, a narrative gains momentum, with power 
not only to support conclusions but to sustain the willingness of jurors 
to draw the inferences . . .  necessary to reach an honest verdict. "26 The 
prosecution's obligation in criminal cases transcends a syllogistic pres­
entation to encompass the telling of "a story of guiltiness."27 
All of this seems to verify Malcolm's charge that the law cares 
more for stories than for truth. Yet, Old Chief is not a case empow­
ering lawyers as storytellers, but one imposing limits on the scope of 
storytelling. The Court bars the prosecution's introduction of a 
somewhat detailed description of the defendant's prior conviction and 
insists on the use of a defense-proffered stipulation in its place. 28 This 
was done to avoid prejudice and discourage jurors from formulating 
too potent a story regarding the defendant's past. 
Malcolm uses the story of Sheila McGough to indict storytelling in 
the courtroom. In the burgeoning literature on storytelling, there has 
been a robust debate about the merits of attacking the legal system by 
means of stories. 29 One needs to search no further than the dispute 
about the story of Stella Liebeck's injury after dousing herself with an 
extremely hot cup of coffee purchased at McDonald's,30 to glimpse the 
23. 519 U. S. 172 (1997). 
24. Old Chief, 519 U. S. at 183. 
25. Id. at 187. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. at 188. 
28. See id. at 190·92. 
29. For discussion of the dangers of this sort of storytelling, see, for example, STEPHEN 
DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLmCS OF REFORM 37-46 (1995), 
and Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal 
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993). 
30. See Andrea Gerlin, How a Jury Decided that a Coffee Spill ls Worth $2.9 Million, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al. 
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nature of the problem. The story of Liebeck's suit and the jury's 
award of $2.9 million has been used as "exhibit A" by tort reformers 
seeking to revamp personal injury law.31 Careful examination of the 
case, however, suggests that the matter is far from simple. It would 
appear that McDonald's may have handled the problem of coffee 
burns in a high-handed manner, disregarded a substantial risk to its 
customers, and been particularly unpleasant in its dealings with the 81-
year-old, badly burned Liebeck.32 In the end, the Liebeck story does 
not shed an enormous amount of light on the question of tort reform 
although it generated a considerable amount of heat. 
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry have been particularly trench­
ant in their criticism of the use of narratives as a method of attacking 
the flaws in the legal system.33 They have concluded "that stories can 
distort legal debate, particularly if those stories are atypical, inaccu­
rate, or incomplete."34 Malcolm's chosen story seems to pose all these 
problems. As Judge Posner has pointed out, there are substantial 
questions about the accuracy and completeness of Malcolm's descrip­
tion. These are critically important in determining whether McGough 
has anything at all to teach us. Assuming that Malcolm's tale may be 
relied upon, it remains to be seen whether it is at all typical or repre­
sentative. If it is a one-of-a-kind phenomenon, it has very little didac­
tic value. A single idiosyncratic anecdote is not proof of anything. 
Unfortunately, Malcolm makes no effort to place McGough in any 
sort of context or demonstrate its general applicability. It seems as if 
she is asking readers to condemn the entire justice system on the 
strength of a single court proceeding that has (if we accept Malcolm's 
analysis) gone awry. Malcolm provides no proof that McGough is 
typical of anything. 
Argument by anecdote poses other risks as well. Anecdotes do not 
provide a sound basis for understanding: "[S]uch evidence permits 
only the loosest and weakest of inferences about matters a field is 
trying to understand. Anecdotes do not permit one to determine ei­
ther the frequency of occurrence of something or its causes and ef­
fects."35 Stories concerning legal misadventure, without more, do not 
tell us anything about why things happened the way they did. To as-
31. See, for example, the remarks of Representative Ron Packer in support of proposed 
tort reform legislation, in CONG. REC. E548 (Mar. 8, 1995). 
32 See Gerlin, supra note 30. 
33. See Farber & Sherry, supra note 29; Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Story­
telling and Constitutional Law: The Medium and the Message, in LAW'S STORIES, supra note 
22, at 37 [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Legal Storytelling]. 
34. Farber & Sherry, Legal Storytelling, supra note 33, at 38. 
35. Michael Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litiga­
tion System-And Why Not?, 140U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1159 (1992). 
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sume that the system is at fault - or, in the McGough case, to con­
clude that narrativity and evidence rules did an "exquisite heroine " in 
- is not justified. Moreover, anecdotes like McGough tend to cut off 
discourse. They do not develop rational or detailed proof but a pre­
packaged story. Such stories are hard to challenge, especially because 
of their sympathetic nature and emotional appeal. Affecting stories 
tend to hide the complexity of events and clothe important questions 
in distracting emotional garb.36 The lamentable image of McGough 
languishing in prison tends to obscure the harder questions raised by 
Malcolm's book. 
These criticisms of Malcolm's anecdotalization of the McGough 
trial might be read to suggest that when the legal system itself places 
reliance on stories, narratives, or anecdotes at trial, it courts disaster. 
The answer to this argument requires an assessment of precisely how 
adjudicators use narratives and how narratives interact with the un­
derlying facts of a case. Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie argue that 
jurors decide the complex questions posed in lawsuits by fashioning 
narratives.37 According to this theory, jurors construct a "causal 
model, " or narrative, to explain the available proof. This model is 
then matched with the decision options made available through legal 
instructions. The best match forms the basis for decision. It is impor­
tant to note, however, that the causal model, or narrative, is not fabri­
cated independently of the proof but, rather, premised upon it. The 
process of narrative formulation is not the product of the lawyers' ef­
forts but a construction undertaken by each juror. The construction is 
a synthetical process that has regard for the evidence and legal rules as 
well as for prior juror experience. Once each juror has fashioned a 
narrative, he or she is required to harmonize it with the similar efforts 
of all the other jurors. No individual's story dictates the outcome. 
The question remains whether jurors pay adequate attention to the 
facts presented to them. While there is no surefire way to answer this 
question, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeise!, in their seminal work The 
American Jury, concluded that "the jury by and large does understand 
the case and get it straight, and ... the evidence itself is a major de­
terminant of the decision."38 Moreover, in almost four cases out of 
every five studied, judge and jury independently came to the same 
verdict - a rate of agreement superior to that of professionals facing a 
36. For an analysis of the same problem in a slightly different setting, see Anne M. 
Coughlin, Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholars/zip, 81 
VA. L. REV. 1229 {1995). 
37. The remainder of this paragraph is based upon Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A 
Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519 
{1991). 
38. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEI SEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 162 (1966). 
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range of other decisional tasks.39 Based on these findings, as well as on 
subsequent research, a number of prominent social scientists have 
concluded that the weight and directionality of evidence are the pre­
ponderant determinants of jury verdicts. As Richard Lempert puts it: 
"A considerable body of research indicates that even when aspects of 
a case might appeal to the prejudices of jurors, unless the case is oth­
erwise close on the facts, the evidence dominates."40 Lempert cites a 
study by Christie Visher supporting this proposition.41 Visher, in tum, 
cites several more to the same effect.42 These conclusions are reiter­
ated by Michael Saks who states: "Studies that have pitted trial evi­
dence and arguments against what jurors bring with them to court 
usually find that the trial information carries far more weight."43 
Similarly, Shari Diamond concludes: "In studies that have measured 
the contributions of juror characteristics and trial testimony to jury 
verdicts, the trial testimony dominates."44 In the end, the empirical re­
search suggests that evidence is key and that narrative construction is 
driven by it. While it is a leap from these observations to concluding 
that jurors find the truth, we have solid evidence for joining with 
Aristotle in arguing: "things that are true and things that are just have 
a natural tendency to prevail over their opposites."45 
Several of Malcolm's charges remain to be considered, including 
two against lawyers: first, that they are silver-tongued tricksters who, 
by twisting the evidence get their way; and second, that they generally 
betray their clients. As to the first, the above-cited social science ma­
terials indicate very serious limits on the power of lawyers to affect 
outcomes. This question was one that Kalven and Zeisel attempted to 
assess. Their key findings are that counsel have only an extremely 
modest impact on decisions and that lawyers are evenly matched more 
than three-quarters of the time.46 In light of these findings, Malcolm's 
39. See Shari S. Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Decisions, 
in THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES, VOLUME II: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 123, 125 tbl.1 
(C.T. Scheiner & B.L. Hammonds, eds. 1983). 
40. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock after Twelve Years, 
in VERDICT 181, 218 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993). 
41. See Christie A. Visher, Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 
LAW & HUM. BEHA V. 1 (1987). 
42 See id. at 5-6. 
43. Michael Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make 
Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. l, 18 (1997). 
44. Shari S. Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and Do Not 
Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178, 182 (1990). 
45. ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC l.1.1355a22-35, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 
(rev. Oxford trans. Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984), quoted in Jane B. Baron & Julia Epstein, ls 
Law Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 141, 146 (1997). 
46. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 38, at354-55. 
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attribution of particular persuasive power to the prosecutor with a 
brilliant narrative approach must be treated with a good deal of skep­
ticism, at least as an indictment of the entire justice system. 
The accusation regarding betrayal is far harder to deal with as it is 
intimately bound up with our reactions to Sheila McGough's story. If 
McGough is a shining paragon of loyalty, then her story stands as a se­
rious accusation against a legal profession that cannot recognize no­
bility or abide devotion. If, on the other hand, McGough is little more 
than an emotionally troubled and inexperienced lawyer who made 
grievous mistakes in attempting to help a conniving client, then there 
is little need to defend McGough's lawyers or the system of which they 
are a part. The betrayal/loyalty question, however, has a larger di­
mension. 
Modem criminal defense lawyers confront the dilemma of loyalty 
on a regular basis. Defense counsel are expected to act with warm 
zeal on behalf of their clients,47 to render them loyal service,48 and to 
guard client confidences.49 Yet, the criminal law regarding accessories 
"forbids a lawyer from intentionally assisting a client in committing a 
crime."50 What this restriction means is a hotly disputed question. 
Some take it to mean that criminal liability can be triggered if a lawyer 
ignores her suspicions or consciously seeks to avoid the truth about a 
client.51 Others challenge this view as too restrictive.52 Even if one 
embraces a less restrictive interpretation of the law on accessories, the 
lawyer's representation, counseling, and drafting can all result in 
criminal charges if undertaken with the goal of advancing a criminal 
objective. Charges of this nature have been made by the government 
in a series of high profile cases including those of several Miami law­
yers defending members of the Cali drug cartel53 and of a New York 
lawyer working on behalf of a prominent member of the Gambino 
47. See MODELCODEOF PROFESSIONALREsPONSIBI LITY Canon 7 (1980) ("[A] lawyer 
should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law."); MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1983) ("A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client."). 
48. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 {1983) ("Loyalty is 
an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client."). 
49. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBI LITY DR 4-101 (1980); MODEL 
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) ("A lawyer shall not reveal infor­
mation relating to the representation of a client . . . .  "). 
50. Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 
355 (1998). The argument in the remainder of this paragraph is based primarily on Green's 
persuasive analysis. 
51. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 134 F.3d 855, 868 (7th Cir. 1998). 
52 See generally Green, supra note 50. 
53. See Mireya Navarro, Lawyers Weigh Effect of Conviction of Missing Colleague, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, § 1, at 24, cited in Green, supra note 50. 
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crime family.54 There are no easy answers in this area. Wisdom coun­
sels restraint before the criminal law is used to discipline lawyers for 
what they perceive as zealous representation, but lawyers are not free 
to ride roughshod. There are limits beyond which loyalty may not be 
pressed. Respect for those limits is not a matter of betrayal but of ne­
cessity in any system premised upon the rule of law rather than indi­
vidual whim. 
V. WHY MIGHT MALCOLM HA VE SEEN IT AS SHE DID? 
It is not easy to determine why Malcolm interpreted McGough's 
case as she did. One might begin by noting that McGough, like 
Malcolm, was a middle-aged woman struggling to make her way in a 
sometimes hostile profession. This similarity of situation was likely to 
have generated some sympathy on Malcolm's part for her subject. Of 
potentially greater importance are two significant events in Malcolm's 
life that may have colored her reaction to McGough's story when she 
became aware of it in the winter of 1996. The first of these was the 
resolution in that year, after more than a decade of litigation, of a libel 
suit filed by psychoanalyst Jeffrey Masson against Malcolm and her 
employer, The New Yorker magazine. The other was Malcolm's par­
ticipation in February 1995 in a Yale Law School symposium entitled 
"Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law."55 
The Masson lawsuit was a bitter and protracted affair that arose 
out of The New Yorker's publication in December 1983 of a two-part 
article entitled "In the Freud Archives."56 This piece presented a 
scathing portrait of Jeffrey Masson, a man who had meteorically risen 
to the prominent position of Projects Director of the Freud Archives 
only to be ousted when he advanced the claim that Freud's work was 
fatally flawed because of the master's cowardly abandonment of the 
"seduction theory," which hypothesized that many psychiatric patients 
were the victims of childhood sexual abuse.57 Masson had been exten­
sively interviewed by Malcolm in preparation for the writing of the ar­
ticle. These interviews had generated more than 1,000 pages of tran­
script and notes.58 Masson sued after the publication of the piece, 
claiming that it "falsely portrayed him as egotistical, vain, and lacking 
54. See United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (charge that lawyer 
was criminal co-conspirator used to disqualify him as counsel). 
55. See LA W'S STORIES, supra note 22, at vii. 
56. The basic facts of the commencement and early stages of the lawsuit are recited in 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
57. For discussion of the seduction theory issue, see Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989). 
58. See Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1397. 
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in personal honesty and moral integrity."59 After a good deal of pre­
liminary legal skirmishing, Judge Lynch of the federal district court for 
the Northern District of California granted Malcolm's motion for 
summary judgment in August of 1987.60 The judge did so despite 
finding that Malcolm had been involved in the "fictionalization or 
dramatization of conversations"61 presented as direct quotations in 
The New Yorker article. 
Masson appealed this ruling to the Ninth Circuit which, in 1989, af­
firmed the district court's summary judgment by a two-to-one vote. 62 
The majority noted that quotes had been fabricated or altered but 
concluded that "[a]n author may . . .  under certain circumstances, fic­
tionalize quotations 'to some extent.' "63 In a sharply worded and 
lengthy dissent, Circuit Judge Kozinski challenged the assertion that 
material presented in quotation marks can be freely fabricated. "As I 
see it," opined Kozinski, "when a writer uses quotation marks in re­
porting what someone else has said, she is representing that those are 
the speaker's own words or something very close to them."64 Accord­
ing to Judge Kozinski, quotations are not fair game for fictionalization 
or alteration. Such manipulation breaches oft-repeated journalistic 
principles. In support of his argument, Kozinski referred to a 1984 
scandal in which a writer for The New Yorker, Alistair Reed, had ad­
mitted that he "regularly used composite characters, nonexistent set­
tings, and invented dialogue in what were purported to be nonfiction 
articles."65 This admission set off a firestorm of criticism from some of 
journalism's leading practitioners, including The New York Times, the 
Atlantic magazine, Time magazine, the Los Angeles Times, and a host 
of others.66 The outcry eventually led the long-time editor of The New 
Yorker, William Shawn, to backtrack from his support for Reed and 
declare: 
We do not permit composites. 
We do not rearrange events. 
We do not create conversations.61 
59. Id. 
60. See generally Masson, 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987). 
61. Id. at 1398. 
62 See Masson, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989). 
63. Id. at 1539 (citations omitted). 
64. Id. at 1548 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
65. Id. at 1560 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
66. See id. 
67. Id. at 1561 (Kozinski, J., dissenting, emphasis in original). 
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By tying Malcolm to this embarrassing episode and to another in­
volving a reporter named Janet Cooke, whose fabrications led her to 
have to surrender a Pulitzer Prize,68 Kozinski had delivered several 
stinging blows. He underscored them by observing, "[t]he circumstan­
tial evidence that defendant Janet Malcolm acted with malice, deliber­
ately or recklessly altering Masson's statements, is very strong in­
deed."69 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in June 
1991, reversed the decision of the two lower courts.70 Justice Kennedy, 
writing for a seven-member majority,71 embraced Judge Kozinski's 
analysis. The Court held that quotation marks are not to be trifled 
with, and that evidence presented by Masson regarding a half dozen 
article passages suggested the possibility that Malcolm had libelously 
falsified the plaintiff's words. This ruling made front page headlines 
and exposed both Malcolm and The New Yorker to further humiliat­
ing public criticism. The case was returned to the district court where, 
in May 1993, a jury found that Malcolm had libeled Masson but could 
not agree on an appropriate damage award.72 Judge Lynch granted 
Malcolm's motion for a new trial, which was held in October of 1994. 
At the second trial a new jury exonerated Malcolm. The second jury 
verdict was appealed to the Ninth Circuit which affirmed the jury's de­
cision in June 1996, thus ending the case.73 
This prolonged legal battle must have been both embarrassing and 
wearing for Malcolm. The only real hero, from Malcolm's point of 
view, would have been the stalwart district court judge who, through 
more than a decade, steered the case to the result he had early on con­
cluded was warranted on the merits. Both appellate judges and juries 
must have appeared fickle from Malcolm's perspective. In light of this 
grueling and all-too-public experience, it would not be surprising if 
Malcolm were attracted to a version of McGough's story that empha­
sized jury incompetence, lawyer perfidy, legal ineptitude, and the 
cynical conclusion that the litigation process is absurd. The only 
"hero" in Malcolm's case was Judge Lynch, and it is remarkable how 
gently Malcolm treats virtually every trial judge connected to the 
McGough story, even those who testified against her at her criminal 
68. See id. at 1561 n.15 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
69. Id. at 1566 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
70. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496 (1991 ). 
71. Justices White and Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part, calling for an even 
stricter standard with respect to the use of quotations. See Masson, 501 U.S. at 525-28. 
72. The history of the case subsequent to the Supreme Court's ruling is set forth in 
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 85 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1996). 
73. See id. 
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trial. Malcolm's experience may help explain why she saw the 
McGough case the way she did. 
The one remaining piece of Malcolm's work that seems to call for 
explanation is its particular emphasis on the baleful effect of narrative. 
At least some of this may be traced to Malcolm's participation in the 
1995 Yale conference. The papers presented at that meeting were ed­
ited into a book entitled Law's Stories,14 which was published by the 
Yale University Press in 1996. Of that book, the seemingly ubiquitous 
Judge Posner has written: 
Remarkably, considering that the book is intended to showcase this new 
movement that I am calling legal narratology, the overall tone of Law's 
Stories is skeptical and critical, even defensive. Criticisms and expres­
sions of doubt outweigh praise and claims of insight, and the criticisms 
are more convincing than the praise.75 
It should come as no surprise that out of this critical assessment of 
narrative, Malcolm might have formulated a rather jaundiced view of 
courtroom storytelling. When the McGough case came along, it may 
have seemed custom-made to challenge legal narrative because of the 
prosecution's smooth presentation and the defendant's refusal to al­
low a neat story to be told on her behalf. 
In a brief essay in Law's Stories, Malcolm set out to analyze side­
bar conferences. As in her book on McGough, she notes a feeling of 
"betrayal" as each lawyer's "mask suddenly dropped"76 during the 
side-bar. Curiously, however, her overarching view of the system ap­
pears more benign in the Yale piece. She praises the side-bar declar­
ing: 
But in relegating to a private place the trial antagonists' negotiations 
over the limits of storytelling - over the containment of hating and 
blaming within crisp rules of procedure (the rules of fair play) - the law 
restores something of what it has taken. By so clearly denoting what is 
backstage and what is onstage, by keeping the illusion-destroying activi­
ties of backstage firmly hidden, the law, with a kind of moving clumsi­
ness, signals its acknowledgment of a possibly higher power than its own: 
the power of the imagination.77 
By the time Malcolm reached the end of her work on Sheila 
McGough's case, she appears to have lost her respect for trials, narra­
tives, and "the power of imagination." Her disillusionment is to be re­
gretted. Its basis is somewhat mysterious. Its consequence, however, 
is the prejudicing of a canny observer who has, in the past, helped us 
74. See Malcolm, supra note 22. 
75. Richard Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 742 (1997). 
76. See Malcolm, supra note 22, at 108. 
77. Id. at 109. 
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scrutinize with the greatest care the way we have told stories about 
poets, murderers, journalists, and psychoanalysts. 
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